Epistemic Feedback Loops (Or: How Not to Get Evidence) by Hughes, Nick
 
Page 1 of 37 
 
Epistemic Feedback Loops 









ABSTRACT:  Epistemologists spend a great deal of time thinking about how we should 
respond to our evidence. They spend far less time thinking about the ways that evidence 
can be acquired in the first place. This is an oversight. Some ways of acquiring evidence 
are better than others. Many normative epistemologies struggle to accommodate this fact. 
In this article I develop one that can and does. I identify a phenomenon – epistemic feedback 
loops – in which evidence acquisition has gone awry, with the result that even beliefs based 
on the evidence are irrational. Examples include evidence acquired under the influence of 
confirmation bias and evidence acquired under the influence of cognitively penetrated 
experiences caused by implicit bias. I then develop a theoretical framework which enables 
us to understand why beliefs that are the outputs of epistemic feedback loops are 
irrational. Finally, I argue that many popular approaches to epistemic normativity may need 
to be abandoned on the grounds that they cannot comfortably explain feedback loops. The 
scope of this last claim is broad: it includes almost all contemporary theories of 






Epistemologists spend a great deal of time thinking about how we should respond 
to our evidence. Historically, they have spent far less time thinking about when and 
how evidence should be acquired in the first place.1 However, this is beginning to 
change. Recently there has been increased interest in ‘zetetic’ epistemology – that is, 
the epistemology of inquiry.2 The zetetic turn is a welcome development. But 
something has been missing from it so far. There are at least two central questions 
 
* Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 
1 This may be because evidence-gathering norms are often thought to be practical, rather than epistemic 
norms, and so outside the purview of epistemology. For this view, see Conee & Feldman (1985), Feldman 
(2000, 2005), Kelly (2003), Hedden (2015), and Cohen (2016). 
2 The phrase ‘zetetic epistemology’ comes from Friedman (2020).  
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for zetetic epistemology: ‘When should we acquire new evidence?’, and ‘How should 
we acquire that evidence?’ And whilst there has been a fair amount of work on the 
first question,3 there has been much less on the second.4 This is unfortunate. Some 
ways of acquiring evidence are better than others. As we will see, many familiar 
normative epistemologies struggle to accommodate this fact. This article attempts to 
develop one that can and does. 
 
Section two explains why evidence acquisition matters and describes a phenomenon 
– epistemic feedback loops – in which it has gone awry, with the result that even a belief 
based on the evidence is irrational, or at least problematic. Section three outlines five 
desiderata for an adequate theory of feedback loops. Sections four to nine develop a 
theoretical framework – ‘dispositionalism’ – with which to understand them and 
show how it satisfies the desiderata. Section ten shows how the framework 
generalises. Section eleven draws out some consequences for normative 
epistemology, arguing, amongst other things, that many popular approaches to 
epistemic normativity may need to be abandoned on the grounds that they cannot 
comfortably explain feedback loops. 
 
 
§II. Epistemic Feedback Loops 
 
 
To see why evidence acquisition matters, consider these three cases, the first two of 
which are examples of confirmation bias and the third of which is an example of 
cognitive penetration caused by implicit bias: 
 
DOMINEERING CEO: Camille is the powerful and intimidating CEO of a large 
media company. She wishes that the company was financially stable. This 
causes her to unconsciously put pressure on the CFO to tell her that the 
company is financially stable. As a result of the CFO’s testimony, she forms 
the belief that matches her desire. 
 
LIKEABLE LEVI: Levi fears that his Sunday league football teammates don’t 
like him. This causes him to unconsciously seek out evidence that 
 
3 For example, Good (1966) and the subsequent literature it generated; Hall & Johnson (1998); Maher 
(1990); Myrvold (2012); Friedman (2019, 2020, fc); Millson (2021); Stjernberg (2021); Thorstad (2021); Falbo 
(fc); Salow (fc); Carr (ms); and Flores and Woodard (ms), amongst others. 
4 Less, but not none. Baehr (2011), Salow (2018), Miracchi (2019), Dorst (2020), Worsnip (fc), and Sosa (ms) 
discuss the issue, as do epistemologists who write about cognitive penetration. 
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disconfirms his fear and avoid evidence that might confirm it. Having 
gathered a wealth of evidence that his teammates like him and none 
indicating that they don’t, he comes to believe that he is liked after all. 
 
RACIST NEIGHBOUR: Finn suspects that his neighbour Solomon is angry. 
Solomon is a young black man, and Finn’s suspicion is the result of an 
unconscious racist implicit bias. Finn’s suspicion causes him to have a 
perceptual experience as of Solomon’s face wearing an angry expression. As 
a result he comes to believe that Solomon is angry. In fact, Solomon’s 
expression is neutral. 
 
Confirmation bias and cognitive penetration are usually theorised separately, but 
from the point of view of evidence acquisition they have important similarities, 
making a theory that explains them conjointly desirable. 
 
What similarities? First, in each of these cases a psychological attitude of an agent 
(Camille’s wish, Levi’s fear, Finn’s suspicion) causes them to unknowingly 
manufacture evidence in favour of a proposition p (The company’s finances are 
stable, Levi is liked, Solomon is angry) which causes them to form a belief that p. 
Second, the resulting beliefs are irrational, or at least epistemically problematic.5 But 
the problem is not with the way that Camille, Levi, and Finn respond to their 
evidence. Had the CFO’s testimony been uncoerced, had Levi’s investigation not 
been biased, and had Finn’s perceptual experience not been caused by his suspicion 
that Solomon is angry, their beliefs would have been fine. Rather, the problem is 
with the way the evidence was acquired in the first place. In each case the evidence 
has, as I will put it, a deviant etiology.6 
 
I’ll call cases like these epistemic feedback loops. This article develops a framework 
which explains why they are epistemically problematic. Its key observation is 
simple: the ways that Camille, Levi, and Finn acquire their evidence could easily 
result in them acquiring misleading evidence. The challenge is to sharpen this 
observation and situate it within a systematic theory. 
 
5 I’m happy to describe them as irrational, but even readers who prefer to think of them as rational-but-
nevertheless-problematic will be able to use the framework I’ll develop to explain what’s going wrong. 
6 Why stipulate that Camille, Levi, and Finn are unconscious of the mechanisms that cause them to 
manufacture evidence? Because if they were aware that their evidence has a deviant etiology it wouldn’t 
be evidence in the first place. If, for example, Finn knew that it was his suspicion that Solomon is angry 
that caused him to have a perceptual experience as of Solomon face wearing an angry expression, then 
the fact that Solomon’s face appears to be wearing an angry expression would not be evidence that he is 
angry. See Salow (2018) for discussion. 
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Epistemic feedback loops should not only be of interest to epistemologists. They can 
have serious consequences. As RACIST NEIGHBOUR suggests, cognitively penetrated 
experiences induced by implicit bias may reinforce racism (c.f. Siegel 2017 who 
discusses similar cases). Confirmation bias has been cited as an explanation for the 
rise of online echo chambers (Quattrociocchi et al. 2016). Feedback loops may even 
shape world-historical events: Jonathan Leader Maynard (fc) argues that Joseph 
Stalin’s paranoid convictions were a primary cause of the Soviet Terror of 1936-1938. 
Suspecting internal conspiracies, Stalin ordered apparatchiks to root out perceived 
saboteurs from within the party. Under pressure, they coerced “confessions” from 
the accused which were taken at face-value by the party leadership as evidence of 






An adequate theory of feedback loops must satisfy a number of desiderata. First, not 
every feedback loop is epistemically problematic. Suppose Josie desires (perhaps 
unconsciously) to be more comfortable. This desire causes her to lie down on the 
sofa, which causes her to believe that she’s comfortable. There is nothing 
epistemically problematic here, even though the case has the same structure as the 
problematic cases: a prior psychological attitude towards p causes the manufacture 
of evidence for p which causes a belief that p. Our first desideratum: 
 
EXCEPTIONS: The theory must be able to account for the fact that some 
feedback loops are unproblematic and explain the differences between these 
and problematic feedback loops. 
 
Second, although they all share the same structure at a certain level of abstraction, 
there are differences between DOMINEERING CEO, LIKEABLE LEVI, and RACIST 
NEIGHBOUR. One difference is between Camille and Finn, on the one hand, and Levi, 
on the other. Camille and Finn’s prior attitude towards p leads directly to the creation 
of evidence for p. Whilst Levi might also directly create some of his evidence (by 
fishing for compliments, for example), he also engages in a process better described 
as selecting evidence, by filtering out unwanted sources. Another difference is in the 
kind of evidence that is manufactured. Finn manufactures visual-perceptual 
evidence for p. Camille manufactures testimonial evidence for p. Levi most likely 
manufactures a combination of the two. A third difference is that Finn manufactures 
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evidence that is in some sense internal to his mind, whereas Camille and Levi 
manufacture evidence in the external world. A fourth difference is in the prior 
attitudes themselves. It is Camille’s wish that causes her to manufacture evidence, it 
is Levi’s fear, and it is Finn’s suspicion. Epistemic feedback loops can take many 
different forms. An adequate theory must be able to accommodate all the forms they 
can take. This is our second desideratum: 
 
VARIETY: An adequate theory must be able to accommodate the various 
forms that feedback loops can take. 
 
Third, the phenomenon is not limited to sophisticated, reflective, agents like 
Camille, Levi, and Finn. Consider: 
 
WOLSEY: Wolsey the dog loves sausages and hopes to find one. This causes 
him to perceptually experience a stick as a sausage, which causes him to 
believe that it’s a sausage.  
 
Wolsey’s belief is epistemically problematic in much the same way as Finn’s (though 
we might hesitate to call it ‘irrational’ – more on this shortly). An adequate theory 
should be able to explain why. Hence, our third desideratum: 
 
INCLUSIVITY: The theory must be able to explain why feedback loops are 
epistemically problematic even when they arise in unsophisticated agents. 
 
Fourth, loop cases (as I’ll call them) are importantly different to bad cases of the kind 
epistemologists are familiar with – cases in which an agent is envatted, deceived by 
an evil demon, lied to by an apparently credible person, tricked by a hidden light 
source into believing that a white table is red, and so on. Although the beliefs of 
agents in these cases are false, they are rationally unimpeachable, unlike Camille, 
Levi, and Finn’s beliefs. This gives us a fourth desideratum: 
 
NUANCE: The theory must be able to explain the differences between loop 
cases and familiar bad cases. 
 
Fifth, although beliefs resulting from feedback loops are problematic, they are liable 
to give rise to ambivalence. Camille, Levi, and Finn aren’t comfortably lumped in 
with agents who fail to respond correctly to their evidence. Compare them with X, a 
patient suffering from Othello Syndrome described in a case study by Pal et al. 
(2012). Amongst other things, X believed that pictures of fruit on his wife’s social 
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media page indicated that she was having an affair. Although Camille, Levi, and 
Finn acquire their evidence in a way that makes their beliefs problematic, they are, 
unlike X, doing well in at least one way; given the evidence they have, it would be 
surprising if they didn’t believe what they do. Indeed, were they to suspend 
judgement on p or disbelieve that p with this evidence in hand, they would seem to 
exhibit another kind of rational failing. Our theory should explain why. This gives 
us a fifth desideratum:  
 
AMBIVALENCE: The theory should explain why beliefs produced by feedback 
loops are okay on a certain dimension of evaluation. 
 
We have five desiderata: EXCEPTIONS, VARIETY, INCLUSIVITY, NUANCE and 
AMBIVALENCE. Is there a theory that satisfies all of them? I think there is. In the next 
sections, I’ll present and defend it. 
 
 
§IV. Functional and Dysfunctional Cognition 
 
 
§4.1. Setting the Stages 
 
My starting assumption is that a core function of cognition is to produce knowledge 
which the agent can use in action. I’ll develop a simple theoretical framework to 
explain feedback loops by reference to cognition working well or badly relative to 
this purpose with respect to a given proposition p.7 The framework builds on ideas 
developed by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010, 2020, 2021, fc1, fc2) and recently put to 
work by Tim Williamson (fc1, fc2) and myself (Hughes fc1, fc2). I’ll call it 
‘dispositionalism’. 
 
The framework makes use of two distinctions.  
 
The first is between cognition working well or badly locally and cognition working 
well or badly broadly. Local evaluations focus on the results cognition produces in 
the world in which it takes place. Broad evaluations focus on the results it produces 
in a range of counterfactual worlds.  
 
7 It is, I believe, possible to develop a version of the framework on the starting assumption that a core 
function of cognition is merely to produce true beliefs (rather than knowledge), though I will not do that 
here. 
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The second distinction is between cognition working well or badly when the agent 
acquires evidence and cognition working well or badly when the agent responds to 
their evidence. I’ll call these the acquisition stage and the response stage respectively.  
 
I’ll say that cognition is functional iff it is working well and dysfunctional iff it is 
working badly. 
 
Since the framework aims to explain commonalities between Camille, Levi, and Finn 
and less sophisticated agents like Wolsey the dog it deliberately avoids employing 
the anthropocentric language, familiar to epistemologists, of justifications, excuses, 
responsibility, reasons, rationality, reasonableness, virtue, oughts, duties, 
requirements, praiseworthiness, blameworthiness, and so on. Such concepts are 
only comfortably applied to sophisticated, self-conscious, reflective, adult humans.8 
Later we will see how the framework can be used to shed new light on some of them. 
 
I’ll make some simplifying assumptions. First, I’ll assume that, for every p, an agent 
either believes that p, suspends judgement on p, or disbelieves that p. Second, I’ll 
assume that an agent believes that p iff they don’t suspend judgement on p or 
disbelieve that p, disbelieves that p iff they don’t suspend judgement on p or believe 
that p, and suspends judgement on p iff they don’t believe that p or disbelieve that 
p. Third, I’ll assume that an agent disbelieves that p iff they believe that not-p. 
Fourth, for the sake of brevity I’ll only focus on the coarse-grained attitudes {belief, 
suspension, disbelief}, ignoring more fine-grained attitudes like credences.9 The first 
two assumptions are arguably unrealistic. It might be possible to take no attitude at 
all towards a proposition. It might be possible to simultaneously take multiple 
attitudes towards a single proposition (for example, under different modes of 
presentation). Suspension might be an umbrella concept covering multiple distinct 
attitudes (Lord & Sylvan fc). I’ll ignore these complications because nothing turns 
on them. Accommodating them in the framework would involve needlessly 







8 See Hughes (fc2) for discussion. 
9 Later on (footnote 28) I’ll briefly describe some ways in which the framework might be adapted to handle 
fine-grained attitudes. 
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§V. The Acquisition Stage 
 
 
Starting with the acquisition stage, the two distinctions described above are applied 
as follows: 
 
• Cognition is locally functional with regards to p at the acquisition stage iff the 
agent does not acquire misleading evidence about p.  
 
• Cognition is locally dysfunctional with regards to p at the acquisition stage iff 
the agent acquires misleading evidence about p.  
 
• Cognition is broadly functional with regards to p at the acquisition stage iff 
the way the agent acquires evidence about p would not normally yield 
misleading evidence about p.  
 
• Cognition is broadly dysfunctional with regards to p at the acquisition stage 
iff it would not be abnormal for the way the agent acquires evidence about 
p to yield misleading evidence about p.  
 
This part of the framework makes use of two concepts – misleading evidence and 
normality – which require further comment. I’ll explain them in turn.  
 
§5.1. Misleading Evidence 
 
§5.1.1. Two Conceptions of Misleading Evidence 
 
What is misleading evidence? We can distinguish between at least two explications 
of the concept, both of which are perfectly legitimate, but only one of which is 
relevant for our purposes. 
 
According to the first explication (the irrelevant one), a piece of evidence e is 
misleading with respect to p just in case p is false and the probability of p is higher 
conditional on e than the unconditional probability of p. Formally:  
 
• (P(p|e) > P(p)) ∧ ~ p 
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This explication focuses on individual pieces of evidence – a single proposition 
known to be true, for instance. The second explication focuses on one’s total body of 
evidence E, comprised of all of the propositions that are part of one’s evidence. We 
are interested in whether E is misleading, not whether e is. Virtually any way of 
acquiring evidence about p will yield some misleading evidence e bearing on p in 
some normal circumstances. Seeing that everyone in the room is under two meters 
tall is some evidence e for the false proposition that everyone in the world is under 
two meters tall (= p) – it raises the probability of p, if only very slightly. But nothing 
abnormal need happen for one to see that everyone in the room is under two meters 
tall. 
 
§5.1.2. Delusive Evidence 
 
When is one’s total evidence E misleading with respect to p? A natural idea is that E 
is misleading with respect to p iff E leads an agent into believing that p when not-p. 
But which agent? The answer cannot simply be the agent who possesses E. The 
presence of images of fruit on his wife’s social media page led X to believe that she 
was having an affair. It does not follow that his evidence was misleading with 
respect to p (= X’s wife is having an affair); the problem was with him, not with his 
evidence. A more plausible idea is that E is misleading with respect to p iff a rational 
response to E yields a false belief that p. 
 
This is close to what I have in mind, but it isn’t quite right for our purposes. It would 
make sense if we took the function of cognition to be to produce true beliefs. But my 
starting assumption is that its function is to produce knowledge, not merely true 
beliefs. If so, a non-knowledgeable belief is as bad as a false belief. So it’s more 
natural within the current framework to say that E is misleading with respect to p 
iff a rational response to E yields a non-knowledgeable belief that p (this could be a 
false belief, of course). In §6.2 we will see how this idea can be de-anthropocentrised 
and made more precise – a rational response is a broadly functional response. 
 
This way of conceptualising misleading evidence is unconventional insofar as it 
delivers the result that, for instance, an agent in a Gettier case has misleading 
evidence. ‘Misleading evidence’ is usually taken to mean: misleading with respect 
to the truth-value of p. But we will think of it as meaning: misleading with respect 
to whether one should believe that p. If beliefs should be knowledge, then evidence 
that will lead to non-knowledgeable beliefs is evidence that should be avoided. 
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Since this is an unconventional way of thinking about misleading evidence, it will 
be useful to have a name for it, in order to avoid confusion with more traditional 
truth-centric ways of thinking. So from here on I’ll call it delusive evidence: 
 
DELUSIVE EVIDENCE: One’s total evidence E is delusive with respect to p if 
and only if a broadly functional (i.e. rational) response to E yields a non-
knowledgeable belief that p. 
 
In line with this, the conditions on functional and dysfunctional acquisition 
described above can be restated as follows: 
 
• Cognition is locally functional with regards to p at the acquisition stage iff 
the agent does not acquire delusive evidence about p.  
 
• Cognition is locally dysfunctional with regards to p at the acquisition stage 
iff the agent acquires delusive evidence about p.  
 
• Cognition is broadly functional with regards to p at the acquisition stage iff 
the way the agent acquires evidence about p would not normally yield 
delusive evidence about p.  
 
• Cognition is broadly dysfunctional with regards to p at the acquisition stage 
iff it would not be abnormal for the way the agent acquires evidence about 




The framework also makes use of the concept of normality. What does it mean to 
say that a way of acquiring evidence would not normally yield delusive evidence, 





10 It might appear, at first glance, that these definitions are circular, since they define broadly functional 
and dysfunctional acquisition in terms of its relationship to delusive evidence, and delusive evidence is 
defined in terms of a broadly functional response (thanks to a referee for pointing this out). However, 
there is no circularity. Circularity would only arise if the definition of a broadly functional response made 
use of the concept of broadly functional or dysfunctional acquisition. But as we will see shortly, it does 
not. (C.f. footnote 22). 
 
Page 11 of 37 
 
§5.2.1. Normal Circumstances 
 
‘Normally’ is being used here as a restricted necessity operator. To say that a way of 
acquiring evidence would not normally yield delusive evidence is to say that in 
normal circumstances it does not yield delusive evidence. To say that it would not be 
abnormal for a way of acquiring evidence to yield delusive evidence is to say that 
even in some normal circumstances it yields delusive evidence.  
 
Normality and abnormality are indexed to ways. So to say that a way w of acquiring 
evidence would not yield delusive evidence in normal circumstances is to say that 
w would not yield delusive evidence in circumstances normal for w. 
 
What are normal circumstances? The question is best answered ostensively, by 
looking at examples. 
 
§5.2.2. Normality in Good/Bad Case Pairs 
 
So, consider a good/bad case pair of the familiar kind. In the good case Annie is 
walking down rue d’Aboukir in Paris, sees that number 44 is a typical Parisian 
apartment building, and so believes, correctly, that p (= 44 is an apartment building). 
Cognition is locally functional – Annie does not acquire delusive evidence about p. 
Filling in the details in the natural way, it is also broadly functional. The way Annie 
acquires her evidence – roughly, through a disinterested openness to receiving 
information from her environment through visual perception11 – will yield delusive 
evidence about p only in abnormal circumstances, such as those in which 44 is 
actually, say, a giant ventilation shaft hidden behind an ingenious façade giving it 
the appearance of being a typical Parisian apartment building. 
 
In the bad case the set-up is exactly the same except that 44 is a giant ventilation 
shaft hidden behind an ingenious façade giving it the appearance of being a typical 
Parisian apartment building.12 As before, Annie believes that p, only this time falsely 
and hence non-knowledgeably. Cognition is locally dysfunctional, as Annie acquires 
delusive evidence. But it is still broadly functional. Although Annie acquires delusive 
evidence, the way she acquires it would not normally yield delusive evidence. It 
only does so because she is in abnormal circumstances.  
 
 
11 Disinterested as in impartial, not uninterested as in indifferent. 
12 As it in fact is. Have a look on Google Earth. 
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What goes for Annie in the bad case also goes for more radical bad cases in which 
the agent is not in touch with their environment, such as those involving envattment 
or the machinations of evil epistemic demons. Suppose that you believe on the basis 
of your perceptual experience that LeBron James has just hit a game-winning three-
pointer. Alas, you’re wrong. You’re not sitting courtside at Staples Centre, you’ve 
been envatted. Even radically bad cases like this are set up on the assumption that 
the agent acquires their evidence in a disinterested and open way, so that were they 
reconnected with the environment they would not acquire delusive evidence. 
Indeed, it is precisely this feature of the agent’s cognition that the evil demon or mad 
scientist exploits as part of their strategy to get the agent to believe falsehoods. 
 
§5.2.3. Normality in Loop Cases 
 
By contrast, the situation is quite different in problematic loop cases. Here cognition 
is broadly dysfunctional. Unlike Annie, Camille, Levi, and Finn are not disinterestedly 
open to receiving information from the environment. Instead they manufacture 
evidence that harmonises with a prior psychological state. It wouldn’t be at all 
abnormal for the ways they acquire their evidence to yield delusive evidence – most 
obviously by yielding evidence that will cause them to falsely believe that p. 
Nothing weird or out-of-the-ordinary would have to happen for this state of affairs 
to obtain. The reason why is clear: in virtue of being biased towards harmony with 
a prior psychological state, their ways of acquiring evidence are indifferent and 
insensitive to their environments. 
 
§5.2.4. Ways of Acquiring Evidence 
 
I’ve described two ways of acquiring evidence. The first is through a disinterested 
openness to one’s environment. The second is by manufacturing evidence that 
harmonises with a prior psychological state. This individuation of ways of acquiring 
evidence is obviously very coarse-grained. More fine-grained individuations are 
possible. We could, for instance, distinguish between ways of acquiring evidence 
that yield visual-perceptual evidence and ways that yield testimonial evidence. We 
could also distinguish between ways of acquiring evidence that fall under the 
umbrella description of being disinterestedly open to one’s environment. Equally 
clearly, this is not a complete taxonomy of ways of acquiring evidence. Nevertheless, 
we have enough here for the purposes of explaining feedback loops, so there is no 
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§5.2.5. What Are Normal Circumstances? 
 
Can we say something general about normal and abnormal circumstances, beyond 
pointing to intuitive examples? As satisfying as it would be to have a reductive 
analysis, we have no right to expect one, for there is no reason to think that normality 
can be defined in terms of more basic concepts. Nevertheless, some things can be 
said. What counts as normal for our purposes is not a matter of statistical frequency. 
It would not be abnormal for this week’s winning lottery numbers to be [04, 10, 18, 
19, 45, 36] even though these numbers will win only very infrequently.13 It would 
also be a mistake to take normal circumstances for performing a task (in our case, 
acquiring evidence) to be circumstances that are favourable to the successful 
execution of that task (e.g. acquiring non-delusive evidence).14 One reason for this is 
because doing so would give us the implausible result that cognition is broadly 
functional no matter how one acquires one’s evidence. Another is because some 
favourable circumstances are intuitively highly abnormal. For instance, favourable 
circumstances for acquiring evidence in the way that Levi does include those in 
which a guardian angel changes the world to fit with his evidence. 
 
Bob Beddor and Carlotta Pavese (2020) suggest that normal circumstances for 
performing a task are, roughly, circumstances in which it would be fair to evaluate 
the performance.15 This seems to fit with what we’ve seen so far. Intuitively, it is not 
fair to negatively evaluate Annie’s way of acquiring evidence based on how it 
performs in the bad case; she was unlucky. By contrast, it is fair to negatively 
evaluate Camille, Levi, and Finn’s ways of acquiring evidence based on how they 
perform in cases in which p is false.  
 
Martin Smith (2010, 2016) argues that normal circumstances are those that require 
no special explanation. Adapting this idea for our purposes, we might say that 
normal circumstances for way w of acquiring evidence to have some outcome o (e.g. 
yielding delusive evidence) are circumstances in which w resulting in o doesn’t 
require a special explanation, and that abnormal circumstances for w resulting in o 
are those in which w resulting in o does require a special explanation. Again, this 
seems to fit with what we’ve seen. Were Annie to end up with delusive evidence, 
 
13 C.f. Smith (2010, 2016) 
14 C.f. Beddor & Pavese (2020). 
15 Beddor and Pavese wisely refrain from proposing this as a non-circular analysis of normal 
circumstances; it may be that judgements about whether it is fair to evaluate a performance in such-and-
such circumstances are guided by tacit judgements about whether those circumstances are normal or 
abnormal for performances of the relevant kind.  
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given the way she acquires it, this would cry out for an explanation – for instance, 
that she was taken in by an ingenious façade. By contrast, no special explanation is 
called for in order for us to understand what’s happened when Camille, Levi, and 
Finn end up with delusive evidence, given how they acquire it.16  
 
I won’t take a stance on these proposals here. Nor will I offer my own. Instead I 




§VI. The Response Stage 
 
 
§6.1. Local Response 
 
Now for the response stage. In keeping with the assumption that a core function of 
cognition is to produce knowledge, cognition is locally functional with regards to p 
at the response stage iff: 
 
1. The agent knows that p, or: 
 
2. The agent knows that not-p, or: 
 
3. The agent suspends judgement on p and the agent is not in a position to 
know that p and not in a position to know that not-p. 
 
Cognition is locally dysfunctional with regards to p at the response stage iff: 
 
1. The agent believes that p without knowing that p, or: 
 
2. The agent disbelieves that p without knowing that not-p, or: 
 
3. The agent suspends judgement on p and the agent is in a position to 
know that p or is in a position to know that not-p. 
 
 
16 Again, we need not view this as an attempt to offer a non-circular analysis. 
17 For other ways of thinking about normality, see Millikan (1984), Nickel (2016), and Graham (2017), 
amongst others. 
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§6.1.1. Being in a Position to Know 
 
This part of the framework makes use of the concept of ‘being in a position to know’. 
When is an agent in a position to know that p? The question to ask is: ‘If the agent 
believed that p at t, would they know that p at t?’. If the answer is ‘yes’ they are in a 
position to know that p at t. If the answer is ‘no’, they are not.18 For illustration, take 
the proposition ‘Angela Merkel’s father was not over 5 meters tall’. Presumably you 
believe it, and rightly so: that belief is knowledge. By contrast, take the proposition 
‘There were 2991 Tigers in India at noon on July 7th 2020’. Presumably you suspend 
judgement on it. Rightly so: you’re not in a position to know if it’s true.19  
 
Cognition would have been locally dysfunctional if you’d believed that there were 
2991 Tigers in India at noon on July 7th 2020, since you are not in a position to know 
whether it is true or false. It would also have been locally dysfunctional if you’d 
suspended judgement on whether Angela Merkel’s father was over 5 meters tall, 
since you are in a position to know that he wasn’t. A consequence is that suspension 
of judgment is not a safe harbour which is always epistemically okay, as it is 
sometimes thought. I think this is the right result. If the function of cognition is to 
produce knowledge which the agent can use in action, it is not working well if it is 
resistant to knowledge.20 
 
We should be careful interpreting ‘in a position to…’ in the statement ‘S is in a 
position to know that p’. On a very liberal interpretation, one is in a position to know 
everything that is entailed by one’s evidence, including all logical and mathematical 
truths, many of which are highly non-obvious. But it is surely wrong to say that the 
average person is cognitively dysfunctional when they suspend judgement on 
whether the Riemann Hypothesis is correct, even though the answer is entailed by 
their evidence. This observation motivates a more restrictive interpretation, to the 
effect that unless one is able to reliably infer p from one’s evidence, one is not in a 
position to know that p. The average person is not able to reliably infer the truth-
value of the Riemann Hypothesis from their evidence – were they to form a belief 
about it, they would be guessing.  
 
18 The conditional ‘if S believed that p, they would know that p’ is a useful heuristic for the purposes of 
latching on to the intended interpretation of ‘in a position to know’, but it is fallible, and so it shouldn’t 
be used in an analysis. We can contrive situations in which S is, intuitively, in a position to know that p, 
but were S to believe that p, p would be rendered false and hence not knowable. 
19 As these examples suggest, our interest is in dispositional belief, rather than occurrent, conscious, 
judgement. Prior to reading this paragraph, you had probably never entertained the proposition ‘Angela 
Merkel’s father was not over 5 meters tall’. Nevertheless, you believed it, dispositionally.  
20 C.f. Williamson (fc2). 
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What is the relevant reading of ‘able’? We should let judgements about cases be our 
guide. If S is intuitively doing okay (locally) in suspending judgement on p, then she 
was not in a position to know whether p. If S is intuitively not doing okay (locally) 
in suspending judgement on p, then she was in a position to know whether p. 
Intuitively, you’re doing okay when you suspend judgement on whether the 
Riemann Hypothesis is correct. You’re not doing okay if you suspend judgement on 
whether Angela Merkel’s father was over 5 meters tall. Of course, there are bound 
to be borderline cases in which intuitions are murky, but precision should not be 
attempted where it is unavailable. 
 
§6.2. Broad Response 
 
As the biconditionals above indicate, whether cognition is locally functional or 
dysfunctional at the response stage is a matter of the results it produces in the world 
in which cognition takes place. Whether it is broadly functional or dysfunctional at 
the response stage depends, as it does at the acquisition stage, on the results it 
produces in a range of counterfactual worlds. We focus on the results it produces 
when the evidence is acquired in a non-deviant way. 
 
Cognition is broadly functional with regards to p at the response stage iff: 
 
1. The agent believes that p and the way the agent responds to the evidence 
for p manifests a disposition to believe that p iff they are in a position to 
know that p, or: 
 
2. The agent disbelieves that p and the way the agent responds to the evidence 
for p manifests a disposition to disbelieve that p iff they are in a position to 
know that not-p, or: 
 
3. The agent suspends judgement on p and the way the agent responds to the 
evidence for p manifests a disposition to suspend judgement on p iff they 
are not in a position to know that p and not in a position to know that not-
p. 
 
Cognition is broadly dysfunctional with regards to p at the response stage iff: 
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1. The agent believes that p and the way the agent responds to the evidence 
for p does not manifest a disposition to believe that p iff they are in a 
position to know that p, or: 
 
2. The agent disbelieves that p and the way the agent responds to the evidence 
for p does not manifest a disposition to disbelieve that p iff they are in a 
position to know that not-p, or: 
 
3. The agent suspends judgement on p and the way the agent responds to the 
evidence for p does not manifest a disposition to suspend judgement on p 
iff they are not in a position to know that p and not in a position to know 
that not-p. 
 
§6.2.1. Knowledge-Conducive/Resistant Dispositions 
 
The idea that doxastic states should be evaluated by looking at the dispositions the 
agent manifests relative to knowledge is developed in detail by Lasonen-Aarnio 
(2010, 2020, 2021, fc1, fc2). Following Lasonen-Aarnio, I’ll call the functional 
dispositions ‘knowledge-conducive’. I’ll call the dysfunctional dispositions 
‘knowledge-resistant’. 
 
What does it mean to say that an agent manifests a disposition to believe that p iff 
they are in a position to know that p? A plausible answer takes its lead from our 
definition of broadly functional acquisition, in which evidence acquisition is broadly 
functional just in case the way the agent acquires evidence does not yield delusive 
evidence in normal circumstances. Following on from that idea, we can say that an 
agent manifests a disposition to believe that p iff they are in a position to know that 
p just in case in normal circumstances the way they respond to their evidence results 
in them believing that p iff they are in a position to know that p.21,22,23 Again, it will 
 
21 C.f. Lasonen-Aarnio (2010, fc1, fc2) 
22 Earlier (footnote 10) I flagged a worry about circularity. Since the framework defines broadly functional 
and dysfunctional acquisition partly in terms of a broadly functional response, it might look as though 
the definitions of broadly functional and dysfunctional cognition are circular. We are now in a position 
to see that they are not. Were the concepts of broadly functional and dysfunctional response being defined 
by reference to broadly functional or dysfunctional acquisition, there would be circularity. But they are 
not. Rather, they are defined independently, in terms of whether, in normal circumstances, the way the 
agent responds to their evidence results in them believing that p iff they are in a position to know that p. 
23 Suppose that p is necessarily false. In that case, there are no circumstances in which one is in a position 
to know that p. Ipso facto there are no normal circumstances in which one is in a position to know that p. 
Hence, if p is necessarily false, cognition can never be broadly functional at the response stage when one 
believes that p. But that is implausible. Suppose you are unwittingly using a faulty calculator. It 
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be helpful to look at some examples, starting with variations on the good and bad 
cases. 
 
§6.2.2. Knowledge-Conducive Dispositions in the Bad Case 
 
So, think again about Annie in the bad case, walking down rue d’Aboukir. She 
believes that 44 is an apartment building (= p). In fact it is an ingenious façade hiding 
a ventilation shaft. Although cognition is locally dysfunctional, since her belief is not 
knowledge, on the natural way of filling in the details of the case it is broadly 
functional: the way Annie responds to her evidence would have resulted in her 
knowing that p in normal circumstances. The only reason she believes without 
knowing is because she is in abnormal circumstances. Hence, she manifests a 
knowledge-conducive disposition. The same goes in radically bad cases. You believe 
on the basis of your perceptual experience that LeBron James has just made a game-
winning three-pointer, but you’re wrong – you’ve been envatted. You believe that p 
without knowing that p, but the way you respond to your evidence would have 
resulted in you knowing that p in normal circumstances. Hence, you manifest a 
knowledge-conducive disposition. 
 
§6.2.3. Knowledge-Resistant Dispositions in the Good and Bad Case 
 
Now imagine that in the bad case Annie instead refuses to believe her eyes and 
inexplicably suspends judgement on whether 44 is an apartment building (= p). 
Cognition is now locally functional, since she’s not in a position to know that p and 
not in a position to know that not-p. However, it is broadly dysfunctional: in normal 
circumstances the disposition Annie manifests would lead to her suspending 
judgement even when she is in a position to know. Hence, she is knowledge-resistant. 
 
incorrectly tells you that 744 x 962 = 714728. Even though this is necessarily false, it is surely rational for 
you to believe it, given that you have no reason to doubt the reliability of the calculator. We can solve this 
problem by tweaking the framework. Instead of saying that cognition is broadly functional with regards 
to p iff, in normal circumstances, the way the agent responds to the evidence for p results in them 
believing that p iff they know that p, we can say that it is broadly functional with regards to p iff, in 
normal circumstances, the way the agent responds to the evidence for p results in them believing that p 
or a relevantly similar proposition p* iff they know that p or p*. This gets us the result that cognition is 
broadly functional when the agent believes that 744 x 962 = 714728 using an apparently reliable (but 
actually faulty) calculator, because the way the agent responds to the evidence yields a knowledgeable 
belief about a relevantly similar proposition p* (namely, the necessary truth that 744 x 963 = 715728) in 
normal circumstances, since normal circumstances are those in which the calculator is not faulty. This 
tweak can also be used to deal with the problem as it arises for suspension of judgement and disbelief. It 
is similar to the way safety theories of knowledge overcome problems concerning necessary truths. 
Thanks to a referee for encouraging me to discuss this issue. 
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The same goes for you if you suspend judgement on whether LeBron just made a 
game-winning three-pointer.  
 
Next, consider the good case again, in which 44 is an apartment building (= p). Annie 
believes that p and this belief is knowledge. Now suppose that a prankster resident 
falsely tells her that it is a façade hiding a ventilation shaft. Annie refuses to believe 
him, despite having no reason to think that he’s lying. Again, cognition is broadly 
dysfunctional, as the way Annie responds to her evidence for p does not manifest a 
disposition to believe that p iff she is in a position to know that p: it would not be 
abnormal for Annie’s dogmatism to cause her to believe that p even when she 
doesn’t know that p.24 She is knowledge-resistant. 
 
§6.2.4. Knowledge-Conducive/Resistant Dispositions in Loop Cases 
 
We saw that Camille, Levi, and Finn’s cognition is broadly dysfunctional at the 
acquisition stage. How do they fare at the response stage? Here cognition is broadly 
functional when they believe that p. Recall, Camille has been told by the CFO that 
the company is financially stable, Levi has received lots of compliments and no 
criticism, and Finn has had a perceptual experience as of Solomon’s face wearing an 
angry expression. It’s no surprise that they believe what they do, given this evidence. 
As noted earlier, the problem is not with how they respond to their evidence, but 
with how it was acquired. Whilst there are normal circumstances in which they 
believe that p without knowing that p, owing to the deviant etiology of their 
evidence, the way they respond to their evidence manifests a disposition to believe 
that p iff they are in a position to know that p when the evidence is acquired in a non-
deviant way: were the evidence not to have a deviant etiology, the way they respond 
to it would normally result in them knowing that p. By contrast, cognition would be 
broadly dysfunctional at the response stage were they to suspend judgement on p. 
Like Annie when she inexplicably suspends judgement on whether 44 is an 
apartment building, they would manifest a disposition to suspend judgement even 








24 C.f. Lasonen-Aarnio (fc2) 
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§VII. Applying the Framework 
 
 
§7.1. Good/Bad Case Pairs 
 
This framework sheds light on epistemic feedback loops. Before we see exactly what 
it says about them, it will be useful to summarise what it says about good/bad case 
pairs in order to highlight the similarities and differences between these and loop 
cases.  
 
The good and bad cases are represented in table 1. The belief rows tell us whether 
cognition is functional or dysfunctional when the agent believes that p, the 
suspension rows tell us whether it is functional or dysfunctional when the agent 
suspends judgement on p, the disbelief rows tell us whether it is functional or 
dysfunctional when the agent disbelieves that p. A green cell with an ‘F’ means 
cognition is functional. A red cell with a ‘DF’ means it is dysfunctional. 
 


















Suspension DF DF 






Suspension F DF 
Disbelief DF DF 
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In several recent papers, I have argued that the bad case is an epistemic dilemma – a 
situation in which one is doomed to do wrong whichever doxastic attitude one 
adopts towards p (Hughes 2019, fc2, fc3, fc4). The table reflects this idea. In the bad 
case there is no way for cognition to be functional both locally and broadly at the 
response stage.25 If the agent suspends judgement on p, then whilst cognition is 
locally functional, it is broadly dysfunctional. If the agent believes that p, then whilst 
cognition is broadly functional, it is locally dysfunctional. If the agent disbelieves 
that p, cognition is both locally and broadly dysfunctional. As we’ll see, feedback 
loops are also epistemic dilemmas, though in a different way. 
 
§7.2. Loop Cases 
 
How should we fill in a table like the one above for loop cases? It depends. Is it 
possible for Camille, Levi, and Finn to come to know that p, given the deviant 
etiology of their beliefs? Intuitively, it is not – or at least, so it seems to me. 
Normality-theoretic approaches to knowledge (e.g., Goodman & Salow 2018, 
Beddor & Pavese 2020) deliver this verdict. According to these views, an agent 
knows that p only if the way the agent forms their belief results in a true belief in all 
normal circumstances. Since there are normal circumstances in which Camille, Levi, 
and Finn falsely believe that p, it follows that they don’t know that p.  
 
However, according to minimalist similarity-theoretic approaches to knowledge, 
which take safety from error in similar worlds to be necessary and sufficient for 
knowing (Lasonen-Aarnio 2010, Byrne 2018, Hirvela fc), it seems to be in principle 
possible for an agent in a loop cases to come to know that p, as there may be no 
nearby world in which they falsely believe that p. Perhaps, for instance, Levi is such 
a fantastic guy that things would have to be very different for him to believe that he 
is liked when he isn’t.  
 
The dispositionalist framework is able to capture the distinctive epistemic properties 
of feedback loops on either assumption. For this reason, I’ll remain neutral on the 







25 Williamson (fc2) echoes this point. 
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§7.2.1. No Knowledge 
 
DOMINEERING CEO, LIKEABLE LEVI, and RACIST NEIGHBOUR don’t specify whether p is 
true (i.e. whether the company is financially stable, Levi is liked, and Solomon is 
angry). Obviously in versions of the cases in which p is false Camille, Levi, and Finn 
can’t come to know that p. But how do things look on the assumption that they can’t 
come to know that p even if p is true (perhaps because they falsely believe that p in 
some normal circumstances)? 
 
In that case, cognition is: 
 
• Locally dysfunctional at the acquisition stage, as they acquire delusive evidence 
about p. 
 
• Locally dysfunctional at the response stage when they believe that p, as they don’t 
know that p. 
 
• Broadly dysfunctional at the acquisition stage, as the way they acquire evidence 
yields delusive evidence about p in some normal circumstances. 
 
• Broadly functional at the response stage when they believe that p, as they manifest 
a knowledge-conducive disposition. 
 
















Page 23 of 37 
 


















Suspension F DF 










Suspension F DF 
Disbelief DF DF 
 
Notice the contrast. None of Annie, Camille, Levi, or Finn know that p. However, 
the framework identifies an additional problem with Camille, Levi, and Finn that 




How do things look on the assumption that knowledge is possible in loop cases? Of 
course, if p is false then Camille, Levi, and Finn can’t come to know that p. In those 
versions of the cases the situation will be the same as above. But what about versions 
of the cases in which p is true and they each successfully come to know that p? 
 
In these cases cognition is: 
 
• Locally functional at the acquisition stage, as they do not acquire delusive 
evidence about p 
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• Locally functional at the response stage when they believe that p, as they believe 
knowledgeably. 
 
• Broadly dysfunctional at the acquisition stage, as the way they acquire their 
evidence for p yields delusive evidence about p in some normal 
circumstances. 
 
• Broadly functional at the response stage when they believe that p, as the way they 
respond to the evidence manifests a knowledge-conducive disposition. 
 
Table 3 represents the situation and compares it with the good case: 
 


















Suspension DF DF 










Suspension DF DF 
Disbelief DF DF 
 
Again, notice the contrast. Although Annie, Camille, Levi, and Finn all know that p, 
the framework identifies a problem with Camille, Levi, and Finn that Annie doesn’t 








On either assumption, a consequence is that feedback loops are also epistemic 
dilemmas – this time at the level of broad cognition. Since cognition is broadly 
dysfunctional at the acquisition stage whatever doxastic attitude the agent adopts, 
it is dysfunctional overall, even though it is broadly functional at the response stage 
when the agent believes that p. 
 
There would be no such dilemma if Camille, Levi, and Finn had not engaged in 
broadly dysfunctional evidence acquisition in the first place, and it is plausible that 
there is a norm prohibiting broadly dysfunctional acquisition. Call it the ‘Acquisition 
Norm’: 
 
ACQUISITION NORM: One must not engage in broadly dysfunctional evidence 
acquisition. 
 
Hence, these are dilemmas perplexity secundum quid – they only arise because agents 
in loop cases have already violated the Acquisition Norm. However, given that they 
now have their evidence they must respond to it – the evidence cannot be ‘undone’, 
so to speak. In this respect feedback loops are different to situations in which an 
agent dysfunctionally believes that p, knows that if p then q, and is on the cusp of 
inferring that q. This agent has an escape route – the thing for them to do isn’t to 
believe that q, but to give up their belief that p. 
 
 
§VIII. Rationality & Oughts 
 
 
In §2 I described Camille, Levi, and Finn’s beliefs as ‘irrational’. Is there a natural 
way of mapping the concept of rationality on to the dispositionalist framework, 
which does not make use of it, but rather makes use of the concepts of functional 
and dysfunctional cognition? I think there is. A natural proposal is that a doxastic 
attitude is rational iff cognition is broadly functional at both the acquisition and 
response stage, and irrational otherwise. This gives us the result that the beliefs of 
agents in familiar good and bad cases, like Annie, are rational, as are those of agents 
envatted and tricked by evil epistemic demons, but that the beliefs of agents in loop 
cases are irrational, even if they are knowledgeable (assuming that they can be 
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knowledgeable).26 It also gives us the result, which may seem undesirable to some, 
that feedback loops are rational dilemmas. 
 
On the plausible assumption that one ought to be rational and ought not to be 
irrational, we can also derive deontic conclusions. Agents like Annie in good and 
bad cases ought to believe that p, as ought agents who are envatted or tricked by 




§IX. The Desiderata 
 
 




Let’s start with EXCEPTIONS. Consider Josie again. She desires to be comfortable. This 
desire causes her to lie down on the sofa, which causes her to believe that she is 
comfortable. Josie acquires evidence for p by making p the case. There are no normal 
circumstances in which this way of acquiring evidence yields delusive evidence. As 
a result, although this case has the same superficial structure as problematic loop 
cases, the dispositionalist framework judges it quite differently. Unlike with 
Camille, Levi, and Finn, Josie’s cognition is broadly functional at the acquisition 
stage. Since her response to the evidence is also broadly functional, the theory tells 
us that Josie’s belief is rational, unlike Camille, Levi, and Finn’s. This is the right 




What about VARIETY? Dispositionalism says that cognition is broadly dysfunctional 
at the acquisition stage iff the way the agent acquires evidence yields delusive 
evidence in some normal circumstances. This diagnosis is indifferent to whether the 
evidence is created (as in RACIST NEIGHBOUR and DOMINEERING CEO) or selected (as 
in LIKEABLE LEVI); whether the prior attitude towards p is fear, desire, suspicion, or 
 
26 What about Wolsey? We might be reluctant to call his beliefs ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’ (see Hughes fc2 
for discussion). If so, we can simply note that his cognition is broadly dysfunctional at the acquisition 
stage and broadly functional at the response stage. 
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something else; whether the evidence is testimonial, visual-perceptual, or of some 
other form; whether the evidence is internal or external to the mind; and whether 
the case is one of confirmation bias or cognitive penetration. Despite these 
differences, in each case dispositionalism identifies a common problem: the way in 
which the evidence was acquired yields delusive evidence in some normal 




What about INCLUSIVITY? Recall, Wolsey’s belief is just as epistemically problematic 
as Finn’s. Since dispositionalism makes no appeal to properties found only in 
sophisticated agents, it is capable of explaining what’s going wrong with Wolsey. 
The way in which he acquires evidence yields delusive evidence in some normal 




What about NUANCE? We’ve already seen that there is a difference between Annie 
in the bad case and our feedback loop agents. Even though Annie’s cognition is 
locally dysfunctional at the acquisition stage, it is broadly functional – Annie would 
not acquire delusive evidence in normal circumstances. This explains why it’s 
rational for her to believe that p, but not rational for Camille, Levi, and Finn to 
believe that p. What goes for Annie also goes for radically bad cases such as those 
involving envattment and the machinations of evil epistemic demons – here too 
cognition is broadly functional at the stage of evidence acquisition. Hence, 
dispositionalism explains the differences between bad cases and loop cases. It also 
recognises similarities between them – cognition is broadly functional at the 
response stage with each of Annie, Camille, Levi, and Finn when they believe that 




What about AMBIVALENCE? As noted, in one way cognition is functional with 
Camille, Levi, and Finn when they believe that p – it is broadly functional at the 
response stage. It would not be functional if they were to suspend judgement on p 
or disbelieve that p. If we were to focus only on the response stage and ignore the 
way in which their evidence was acquired, Camille, Levi, and Finn would seem to 
be paragons of rationality. By contrast, patient X is broadly dysfunctional at the 
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response stage. His evidence, we may suppose, is not acquired in a deviant way. 
Rather, he fails to respond to it correctly – images of fruit on your wife’s social media 
page are not evidence that she is having an affair. So dispositionalism identifies a 
significant difference between Camille, Levi, and Finn, on the one hand, and patient 






The dispositionalist framework also generalises, giving us the correct verdicts about 
another class of cases.27 A characteristic feature of feedback loops is that a prior 
attitude towards p causes the agent to manufacture evidence in favour of p. Feedback 
loops are a striking example of bad evidence acquisition. But there is no reason to 
think that the only way one can engage in bad acquisition is by manufacturing 
evidence in accordance with a prior attitude. We can imagine cases in which an 
agent has no prior attitude towards p, but unwittingly manufactures or selects 
evidence in favour of it nonetheless.  
 
To see this, consider Larry. Larry is a detective. Unfortunately, he’s a very lazy 
detective. Worse still, he doesn’t know it – he thinks he’s a model of diligence. 
Investigating a recent murder, Larry gathers up what he believes to be all the 
relevant available evidence concerning the identity of the murderer. This evidence 
points to Ryan being the man who did the deed. In fact, however, Larry doesn’t have 
anything like all the relevant available evidence. Unbeknownst to him, his laziness 
caused him to gather only the evidence that was most easily available, which just so 
happens to indict Ryan. 
 
Even if Larry believes that Ryan is the murderer, thereby responding rationally to 
the evidence he posesses, it is clear that his belief is epistemically defective. 
Dispositionalism predicts this. Although Larry’s cognition is broadly functional at 
the response stage, it is broadly dysfunctional at the acquisition stage, since the way 
that he acquires his evidence yields delusive evidence about p in some normal 
circumstances. This is true even though (we may suppose) Larry had no prior 
attitude towards the proposition that Ryan is the murderer. Many other similar cases 
could be constructed. Thus, the dispositionalist framework generalises to explain 
 
27 Thanks to a referee for prompting me to discuss this. 
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even certain cases of bad evidence acquisition that lack some of the characteristic 
features of feedback loops. 
 
 
§XI. Consequences for Normative Epistemology 
 
 
This completes my account of feedback loops.28 In this section I’ll draw out some 
consequences for normative epistemology. 
 
Many theories of rational belief are unable to smoothly explain feedback loops. Here 
I’ll give two examples from the recent literature, before extracting a general lesson. 
In each case the problem is the same. The theories are designed to deal with the 
response stage of cognition but ignore the acquisition stage. Patching them up by 
employing some of the tools of dispositionalism to handle the acquisition stage 
results in hybrid theories that are less simple, less parsimonious, and less elegant 
than dispositionalism. Since dispositionalism is able to smoothly explain feedback 




28 I have only presented an account of feedback loops for the coarse-grained atttitudes {belief, suspension, 
disbelief}. Presumably feedback loops can also produce more fine-grained attitudes like credences. It 
would be interesting to see how the framework might be adapted to handle such cases (thanks to a referee 
for encouraging me to think about this). Unfortunately, there is no space to properly explore this issue 
here – it is a question for future work. Nevertheless, I will briefly mention a couple of options. Sarah Moss 
(2018) argues that credences can be knowledge, even if they are not truth-apt. She proposes a knowledge 
norm for credences: one ought to have credence n in p iff n is knowledge. If we accept these ideas, 
extending the framework to handle credences should be a fairly straightforward matter. Cognition will 
be locally dysfunctional at the acquisition stage just in case one acquires delusive* evidence for p, where 
delusive* evidence is a body of evidence E such that a rational response to E results in a non-
knowledgeable credence n in p. Otherwise, it will be locally functional. Cognition will be broadly 
dysfunctional at the acquisition stage just in case it would not be abnormal for the way the agent acquires 
evidence for p to yield delusive* evidence for p. Otherwise, it will be broadly functional. Cognition will 
be locally dysfunctional at the response stage just in case the agent has a non-knowledgeable credence in 
p or has an imprecise credence in p despite being in a position to have a knowledgeable precise credence 
in p (imprecise credences being the credal analog to suspending judgement). Otherwise it will be locally 
functional. It will be broadly dysfunctional at the response stage just in case the way the agent responds 
to the evidence does not manifest a disposition to have a knowledgeable credence in p, and broadly 
functional otherwise. Of course, the idea that credences can be knowledge is controversial. A natural 
choice for those who reject it is to try to develop an accuracy-centric version of the framework, akin to a 
truth-centric version of the framework for coarse-grained attitudes. I believe this can be done, but 
working out the details is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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§11.1. Lord’s Reasons-First View 
 
Errol Lord (2018) argues that one rationally believes that p iff one believes that p for 
a sufficient objective reason r to do so and manifests know-how to use r as a reason 
to believe that p.29 He maintains that only facts are objective reasons. In order to 
accommodate the observation that it’s rational for Annie to believe that 44 is an 
apartment building in the bad case, despite it not being a fact that it is an apartment 
building, he maintains that the fact that it perceptually appears to Annie that p is a 
sufficient objective reason for her to believe that p.  
 
However, just as it perceptually appears to Annie that 44 is an apartment building, 
so too it perceptually appears to Finn that Solomon is angry. Yet whereas Annie’s 
belief is rational, Finn’s belief is irrational (or, at least, problematic in a way that 
Annie’s isn’t). Nothing in Lord’s account provides him with the resources to explain 
this difference. The upshot is that his theory cannot handle feedback loops. Now, 
admittedly, Lord’s theory isn’t designed to deal with such cases – he is interested in 
what I have been calling the ‘response stage’ of cognition. Nevertheless, once we 
step back and take a broader view of cognition, this is, if not a decisive reason to 
reject his view, at least a strike against it.30 
 
An obvious response is that Lord can simply help himself to the idea of cognition 
being broadly functional or dysfunctional at the acquisition stage in order to deal 
with the problem. That’s true, so we don’t have a knock-down objection to his view 
here. But it is a move that comes with a cost. The resulting view would be that one 
rationally believes that p iff: 
 
(a.) One believes that p for a sufficient objective reason r to do so and 
manifests know-how to use r as a reason to believe that p, and  
 
(b.) One acquires r in a broadly functional way.  
 
Unlike dispositionalism, this is a hybrid view. It uses one theoretical framework to 
deal with the acquisition stage – employing the concept of the manifestation of ways 
of acquiring evidence in normal circumstances – and an entirely different theoretical 
framework to deal with the response stage – employing the concepts of believing for 
a sufficient objective reason r and manifesting know-how to use r as a reason to 
 
29 Kiesewetter (2017) holds a similar view. 
30 Miracchi (2019) also argues that Lord’s view cannot handle cases where the agent acquires their 
evidence in a bad way, though her approach is different to mine. 
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believe that p. Whilst we shouldn’t reject hybrid views out of hand, simplicity, 
parsimony, and elegance speak in favour of accepting the dispositionalist view, 
since it gets the job done with fewer resources. There is, then, at least a pro tanto 
reason to prefer dispositionalism to Lord’s Reasons-First view. 
 
§11.2. Dutant & Littlejohn’s Probable Knowledge View 
 
Dutant and Littlejohn (fc) argue that it is rational for one to believe that p iff it is 
sufficiently probable on one’s evidence that one knows that p. Is it sufficiently 
probable on Annie’s evidence in the bad case that she knows that p? Dutant and 
Littlejohn don’t say (they focus on how their view handles lottery and preface cases). 
Presumably it is. If it wasn’t, the view would be a non-starter – any plausible theory 
of rationality must deliver the verdict that Annie’s belief is rational. Is it probable on 
Camille, Levi, and Finn’s evidence that they know that p? Again, the answer is 
presumably ‘yes’ – at least according to Dutant and Littlejohn’s view. They make no 
distinction between functional and dysfunctional evidence acquisition – like Lord, 
they are only interested in the response stage – and Camille, Levi, and Finn’s beliefs 
would be rational were their evidence not to have a deviant etiology. But this means 
that their view faces the same problem as Lord’s: as things stand, it cannot explain 
why Annie’s belief in the bad case is rational but Camille, Levi, and Finn’s beliefs 
are irrational (or, at a minimum, problematic). 
 
Of course, the problem is not insurmountable. Like Lord, Dutant and Littlejohn are 
free to help themselves to the idea of cognition being broadly functional or 
dysfunctional at the acquisition stage in order to deal with the problem. But, as 
before, there is a price to be paid, for the resulting hybrid theory is less simple, less 
parsimonious, and less elegant than dispositionalism. 
 
§11.3. A Lesson 
 
A broader lesson can be taken from the above. Normative epistemology needs to 
account for the fact that some ways of acquiring evidence are bad and others are 
okay. The best way to do so, I suggest, is to look at the outcomes that different ways 
of acquiring evidence produce in normal circumstances. Since a simpler theory is, 
ceteris paribus, a better theory, this gives us a reason to adopt the same approach to 
evaluating ways of responding to evidence – looking at the outcomes that different 
ways of responding to evidence produce in normal circumstances. This puts 
pressure on theories of the response stage that don’t take this approach. There are 
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many of them. They include (at least) Evidentialism in its many guises (e.g. Conee 
& Feldman 2004, Smith 2016); Coherentism (e.g. Lehrer 1990); Phenomenal 
Conservatism (e.g. Huemer 2001); Dogmatism (e.g. Pryor 2000);31 Simple Process 
Reliabilism (e.g. Goldman 1979); and many Knowledge-First theories (e.g, Bird 2007, 
Reynolds 2011, Ichikawa 2014). This list is open-ended. 
 
§11.4. Existing Theories of Cognitive Penetration 
 
There has been some work on the epistemology of cognitive penetration. Since the 
dispositionalist framework aims to explain what’s going wrong in cases of cognitive 
penetration, we should compare it to existing theories. There are reasons to think 
that dispositionalism usurps these theories. 
 
§11.4.1. The Generalisation Problem 
 
Let me explain. Theories of cognitive penetration focus, naturally enough, on cases 
like RACIST NEIGHBOUR. But the phenomenon of epistemic feedback is broader than 
that – cases of confirmation bias like DOMINEERING CEO and LIKEABLE LEVI don’t 
involve cognitive penetration. A problem that many attempts to account for 
cognitive penetration would face were we to treat them as general theories of 
epistemic feedback loops (though of course they are not offered as such) is that they 
fail to generalise in a way that explains the broader phenomenon.  
 
For example, consider Matthew McGrath’s (2013a, 2013b) ‘quasi-inferential’ account 
of cognitive penetration. McGrath argues that beliefs like Finn’s are unjustified 
because the higher-level penetrated perceptual experience (Finn’s experience as of 
Solomon’s face wearing an angry expression) on which the belief that p is based is 
unjustifiably quasi-inferred from lower-level perceptual experiences such as shape, 
size, colour, texture, etc. This process, McGrath argues, is analogous to leaping to a 
conclusion from insufficient evidence. 
 
Were we to treat this as a general theory of what’s going wrong in epistemic 
feedback loops, it would face the generalisation problem. It doesn’t explain what’s 
going wrong in loop cases involving confirmation bias, and so it wouldn’t satisfy 
the VARIETY desideratum. Camille does not believe that the company is financially 
stable as a result of a quasi-inference from lower- to higher-level perceptual 
 
31 I’m not the first to point out that cases like RACIST NEIGHBOUR cause problems for Phenomenal 
Conservatism and Dogmatism. See Lyons (2011), Siegel (2012, 2017), and McGrath (2013). 
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experiences, or, for that matter, as a result of any kind of inference akin to leaping to 
conclusions. She believes it because the CFO told her so (albeit under pressure). 
Similarly, Levi doesn’t believe that he’s liked because of a dodgy inference. He 
believes it because he’s had lots of compliments and no criticism. Whatever its merits 
as a theory of cognitive penetration, McGrath’s account would be inadequate as a 
theory of feedback loops. 
 
Were we to treat them as theories of feedback loops, many theories of cognitive 
penetration would face the same problem as McGrath’s – failing to generalise to 
explain the broader phenomenon. It would be a problem for Chudnoff’s (2020) 
‘Presentational Conservatism’, Siegel’s (2017) ‘Rationality of Perception’ thesis, 
Brogaard’s (2013) ‘Sensible Dogmatism’, Teng’s (2016) ‘Imagining Account’ and 
Vahid’s (2014) account appealing to the sensorimotor theory of perception, amongst 
others.  
 
One might think that a theory of cognitive penetration like one of the above can 
happily co-exist alongside a dispositionalist theory of feedback loops, with the 
former providing an account of the epistemology of cognitive penetration 
specifically, and dispositionalism providing an account of feedback loops more 
generally. But, in fact, it isn’t clear that they can. It is a general methodological point 
that if A and B are instantiations of the same phenomenon, and one theory (call it 
‘AB-Theory’) successfully explains both A and B, whereas another (‘B-Theory’) could 
at most explain B, then B-Theory is either redundant or false. It is redundant if it is 
compatible with AB-Theory. It is false if it is incompatible with AB-Theory. Either 
way, we no longer have any use for B-Theory, for it is superseded by AB-Theory. 
On the account I have offered here, the theories of cognitive penetration above are 








32 Thanks to Bob Beddor, Kevin Dorst, Daniel Drucker, Adam Etinson, David Faraci, Giada Frantantonio, 
Rachel Fraser, Alex Grzankowski, Mike Hannon, Louise Hanson, Max Hayward, Jaakko Hirvela, 
Caroline Krager, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, Clayton Littlejohn, Robin McKenna, Lisa Miracchi, Thi Nguyen, 
Andrew Peet, Bernhard Salow, Rob Simpson, Tim Williamson, Elise Woodard, two anonymous referees, 
and audiences at the University of Helsinki, the University of Glasgow, and the Inquiry Network Group. 
 





Baehr, J. 2011. “Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue” in Dougherty, T. (ed.) 
Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Beddor, B. & Pavese, C. 2020. “Modal Virtue Epistemology” Philosophical and 
Phenomenological Research 101 (1): 61-79 
Bird, A. 2007. “Justified Judging” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1): 
81-101 
Brogaard, B. 2013. “Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism” Tucker, C (ed.) 
Seemings and Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Byrne, A. 2018. Transparency and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Carr, J. ms. “Accuracy, Inquiry, and Belief” 
Cohen, S. 1984. “Justification and Truth” Philosophical Studies 46 (3): 279-295 
Cohen, S. 2016. “Theorizing About the Epistemic” Inquiry 59 (7-8): 839-857 
Conee, E. & Feldman, R. 1985. “Evidentialism” Philosophical Studies 48 (1): 15-34 
Conee, E. & Feldman, R. 2004. Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Chudnoff, E. 2020. “Experience and Epistemic Structure: Can Cognitive Penetration 
Result in Epistemic Downgrade” Nes, A. & Chan, T. (eds.) Inference and 
Consciousness. Routledge 
Dorst, K. 2020. “Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 100 (3): 586-632 
Dutant, J. & Littlejohn, C. forthcoming. “Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance” 
Simion, M. & Brown, J. (eds.) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Good, I.J. 1966. “On the Principle of Total Evidence” British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 17 (4): 319-321 
Falbo, A. forthcoming. “Inquiry and Confirmation” Analysis 
Feldman, R. 2000. “The Ethics of Belief” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 
(3): 667-695 
Feldman, R. 2005. “Epistemological Duties” Moser, P. & Feldman, R. (eds.) The 
Oxford Handbook of Epistemology: 253-264. Oxford University Press 
Flores, C. & Woodard, E. manuscript. “Epistemic Vigilance: In Defense of 
Epistemic Norms on Evidence-Gathering” 
Friedman, J. 2019. “Checking Again” Philosophical Issues 29 (1): 84-96 
Friedman, J. 2020. “The Epistemic and the Zetetic” The Philosophical Review 129 (4): 
501-536 
 
Page 35 of 37 
 
Friedman, J. forthcoming. “Zetetic Epistemology” Reed, B. & Floweree, AK. (eds.) 
Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere. Routledge. 
Goldman, A. 1979. “What Is Justified Belief?” Pappas, G. (ed.) Justification and 
Knowledge. Dordrecht 
Goldman, A. 1986 Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press 
Goodman, J. & Salow, B. 2018. “Taking a Chance on KK” Philosophical Studies 175 
(1): 183-196 
Graham, P. 2017. “Normal Circumstances Reliabilism: Goldman on Reliability and 
Justified Belief” Philosophical Topics 45 (1): 33-61 
Greco, J. 2005. “Justification is not Internal” in Contemporary Debates in 
Epistemology. Wiley-Blackwell. 
Hall, R. & Johnson, C. 1998. “The Epistemic Duty to Seek More Evidence” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2): 129-139 
Hedden, B. 2015. “Options and Diachronic Tragedy” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 90 (2): 423-451 
Hirvela, J. forthcoming. “Global Safety – How to Deal With Necessary Truths” 
Synthese 
Huemer, M. 2001. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Rowman & Littlefield 
Hughes, N. 2019. “Dilemmic Epistemology” Synthese 196: 4059-4090 
Hughes, N. forthcoming-1. “Evidence and Bias” Lasonen-Aarnio, M. & Littlejohn, 
C. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence 
Hughes, N. forthcoming-2. “Epistemic Dilemmas Defended” Hughes, N. (ed.) 
Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Hughes, N. forthcoming-3. “Who’s Afraid Of Epistemic Dilemmas?” Stapleford, S., 
Steup, M. & McCain, K. (eds.) Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles 
Hughes, N. forthcoming-4. “Epistemology Without Guidance” Philosophical Studies 
Ichikawa, J. “Justification Is Potential Knowledge” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 
(2): 184-206 
Kiesewetter, B. 2017. The Normativity of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Kelly, T. 2003. “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3): 612-640 
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. 2010. “Unreasonable Knowledge” Philosophical Perspectives. 24: 
1-21 
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. 2020. “Enkrasia or Evidentialism? Learning to Love 
Mismatch” Philosophical Studies 177 (3): 597-632 
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. 2021. “Dispositional Evaluations and Defeat” Brown, J. & 
Simion, M. (eds.) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Page 36 of 37 
 
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. forthcoming-1. “Virtuous Failure and Victims of Deceit” 
Dutant, J. & Dorsch, F. (eds.) The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press 
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. forthcoming-2. “Perspectives and Good Dispositions” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
Lehrer, K. 1990. Theory of Knowledge. Westview Press 
Littlejohn, C. 2013, "The Russellian Retreat" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
113 (3): 293–320 
Lord, C., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. 1979. ‘Biased assimilation and attitude 
polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence’. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(11): 2098–2109  
Lord, E. 2018. The Importance of Being Rational. Oxford University Press 
Lord, E. & Sylvan, K. forthcoming. “Beginning in Wonder: Suspensive Attitudes 
and Epistemic Dilemmas” Hughes, N. (ed.) Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University 
Press 
Lyons, J. 2011. “Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of 
Perception” Philosophical Issues 21: 289-311 
Maher, P. 1990. “Why Scientists Gather Evidence” British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science 41 (1): 103-119 
Maynard, JL. forthcoming. Ideology and Mass Killing. Oxford University Press 
McGrath, M. 2013. “Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The 
‘Bad Basis’ Counterexamples” Tucker, C. (ed.) Seemings and Justification. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
Millikan, R. 1984. Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. MIT Press 
Millson, J. 2021. “Seeking Confirmation: A Puzzle for Norms of Inquiry” Analysis 
80 (4): 683-692 
Miracchi, L. 2019. “When Evidence Isn’t Enough: Suspension, Evidentialism, and 
Knowledge-first Virtue Epistemology” Episteme 16: 413-437 
Moss, S. Probabilistic Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 
Myrvold, W. 2012. “Epistemic Values and the Value of Learning” Synthese 187 (2): 
547-568 
Nickel, B. Between Logic and the World: An Integrated Theory of Generics. Oxford 
University Press.  
Pal, K. et al. 2012. “Othello Syndrome Secondary to Ropinirole: A Case Study” Case 
Reports in Psychiatry 353021 
Pryor, J. 2000. “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist” Nous 34 (4): 517-549 
Quattrociocchi, W., Scala, A., & Sunstein, C. 2016 “Echo Chambers on Facebook” 
Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2795110 
Reynolds, S. 2011. “Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge” Philosophical 
Studies 163: 367-383 
 
Page 37 of 37 
 
Salow, B. 2018. “The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing For Compliments” Mind, 127 
(507): 691-728 
Salow, B. forthcoming. “The Value of Evidence” Littlejohn, C. & Lasonen-Aarnio, 
M. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Oxford University Press. 
Siegel, S. 2012. “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification” Nous 46 (2): 
201-222 
Siegel, S. 2017. The Rationality of Perception. Oxford University Press 
Smith, M. 2010. “What Else Justification Could Be” Nous 44 (1): 10-31 
Smith, M. 2016. Between Probability and Certainty. Oxford University Press 
Sosa, E. manuscript. “Epistemic Explanations” 
Stjernberg, F. 2021. “Epistemic Vices, Critical and Zetetic” Science and Proven 
Experience, Vetenskap Och Beprovad Erfarenhet 
Teng, L. 2016. “Cognitive Penetration, Imagining, and the Downgrade Thesis” 
Philsophical Topics 44 (2): 405-426 
Thorstad, D. 2021. “Inquiry and the Epistemic” Philosophical Studies 
Vahid, H. 2014. “Cognitive Penetration, the Downgrade Principle, and Extended 
Cognition” Philosophical Issues 24 (1): 439-459 
Williamson, T. forthcoming-1. "Justifications, excuses, and sceptical scenarios" 
Dutant, J. & Dorsch, F. (eds.) The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press 
Williamson, T. forthcoming-2. “Epistemological Ambivalence” Hughes, N. (ed.) 
Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press 
Worsnip, A. forthcoming. “The Obligation to Diversify One’s Sources: Against 
Epistemic Partisanship in the Consumption of News Media” Fox, C. & Saunders, J. 
(eds.) Media Ethics: Free Speech and the Requirements of Democracy. Routledge. 
